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DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [PHUM](#) [SU](#) [AU](#)  
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER MEETINGS IN KHARTOUM: DARFUR VERDICT  
STILL UNKNOWN, BUT CRACKS IN GOS HARD-LINE BEGINNING TO  
APPEAR

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME: REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)

11. (C) Summary: After a hostile welcome at the airport, Assistant Secretary Frazer fought to advance the three overarching goals of her visit to Khartoum: the U.S. seeks to address the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and to foster an improvement in the bilateral relationship. A/S Frazer also carried a personal letter from President Bush to President Bashir, which she only intended to deliver in person, despite requests otherwise. Frazer said her goal was to understand the Sudanese perspective and explore ways of moving the relationship forward. A/S Frazer emphasized, however, that any improvement in the bilateral relationship depended on a resolution of the Darfur crisis. In order to do so, Sudan must accept a UN force, and must do so now. All, except Minawi and Kiir, backed the official Government of Sudan line refusing to accept a transition of the African Union peacekeeping mission to UN command. However, Foreign Minister Akol and Presidential Advisor Ismail were willing to consider how we might bridge the gap to strengthen AMIS and work with the international community on efforts to bring onboard non-signatories to the DPA. A/S Frazer expects to meet with President Bashir August 29. End summary.

12. (U) A/S Frazer met with the following Government of Sudan officials in a series of meetings August 27-28: Salva Kiir, First Vice President; Minni Minawi, Senior Assistant to the President; Lam Akol, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Maghzoub Al-Khalifa, Presidential Advisor; and Mustafa Osman Ismail, Presidential Advisor and former Foreign Minister. The meetings below are reported in sequential order.

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Foreign Minister Akol  
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13. (C) The Foreign Minister acknowledged the positive role played by the U.S. in both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and DPA, in addition to its generous humanitarian assistance to Sudan. Dr. Akol also looked forward to a meeting at the most senior level between their respective Presidents, an upgrade in their envoys to Ambassadorial rank, relaxation of the sanctions and the removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. A problem of communication, however, remained between their two countries; neither understood the other and serious matters were being discussed in public. This had served to harden feelings on the Sudanese side. A/S Frazer noted the fundamental divergence of opinion between their two countries on Darfur; while the U.S. favored a transition from AU to UN peacekeeping troops, the Government of Sudan seemed convinced that a military solution was possible.

14. (C) The Foreign Minister noted an additional complication: press reports of the Assistant Secretary's comments that "Sudan must stop the genocide" and accept UN troops had poisoned the atmosphere. If this was the message she carried from President Bush, then it had already been delivered via the press. This dynamic had to change if the two countries were to improve the bilateral relationship. Akol understood that neither U.S. nor European troops would deploy to Darfur, but the issue had transcended to a political plane. A/S Frazer concurred the bilateral dialogue was strained but pointed out that it is a matter of official U.S. policy that genocide has occurred in Darfur and AMIS should transition to a UN operation. She noted that publicly-stated policy is clearly not the private message she was sent to deliver to President Bashir. Moreover, she cited unhelpful rhetoric that goes back for months on the Sudanese side, such as President Bashir's pledges to "wage jihad versus the U.S." and promises to "go to the grave" before approving a transition to UN command in Darfur. She recommended as we go forward to improve bilateral relations that we not allow public rhetoric to distract us from private and serious policy discussion.

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Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa  
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15. (C) Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa claimed that implementation of the DPA was progressing well in the South and the East, with only lingering trouble in the North. He said that 18 of Darfur's 23 municipalities, comprising 85 percent of the region's population, were secure and that the AU must be given the opportunity to stabilize the region. Al Khalifa emphasized the benefit of proceeding with the

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Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. When asked about the Sudanese government's preferred method of dealing with non-signatories, he said he preferred to try to bring onboard the DPA non-signatories rather than sanction them. Then Al Khalifa said that the passage of a UN Security Council resolution on re-hatting of the AU force would indicate that "Africans aren't capable." While thanking Al Khalifa for the Government's efforts to bring together the disparate factions in Darfur, Frazer reminded him of the USG's long-stated interest in bolstering the AU, but explained that a juncture had been reached where continued failure in Darfur would undermine the organization's potential for future operations.

Only the UN had the organizational capacity to defuse the conflict, and the model for UN re-hatting of African forces had been successful in the past in Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Frazer said that the UNSCR, which would pass within days, accounted for Sudanese concerns on sovereignty and was not intended to disarm the Sudanese Armed Forces, nor arrest Sudanese officials that might be ICC-indicted. She also warned that Sudanese plans to deploy 10,500 troops would further destabilize Darfur and lead to an even greater humanitarian crisis.

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Presidential Advisor Ismail  
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16. (C) In two separate meetings with A/S Frazer, Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail initially complained that the U.S. had not adequately consulted with the Government of Sudan on a transition to UN command and predicted that passage of the UNSCR would lead to an explosion of violence throughout the country. To avoid this, he detailed a four-point plan for the way forward: 1) remove the Darfur issue from the international spotlight by "freezing" deliberations in the Security Council and allow for quiet, back-room negotiation; 2) explore an increase in the AU-force level by soliciting troop contributions from Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria and for financial contributions from the Arab League; 3) give the necessary mandate to the

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to protect humanitarian convoys; and 4) support implementation of the DPA with Minawi as the head of the Darfur Transitional Authority. He proposed that a six-month assessment period be allowed for discussions between the U.S. and the Sudan on Darfur and other outstanding bilateral issues. According to Ismail, Sudanese opposition to a UN force in Darfur derived from the lack of a serious U.S. effort to improve relations with Sudan despite cooperation on counterterrorism, the CPA, and the DPA. A/S Frazer disputed any contention that previous bilateral dialogue on the UN force was insufficient, saying that we had been in consultations since 2005, the time for consultation was over, and emphasized that the UNSC would pass the resolution in the near future. She also reiterated the importance of President Bush's message that she intended to deliver personally to Bashir.

17. (C) By their second meeting, Ismail had used his influence as a former foreign minister to secure an August 29 meeting between A/S Frazer and Bashir, noting again the value he placed on continued consultation. A/S Frazer explained that the SAF mobilization of 10,500 troops in preparation for an offensive in Darfur made dialogue more difficult, particularly as such actions were in clear violation of previous UNSCRs and Sudanese commitments, such as the DPA. She explained that as a matter of practicality UN forces would not deploy without Sudanese consent. She reminded Ismail that the timeline was short and the UNSC would pass a resolution in the next few days. There was not six months left for consultation, but there might be a space between the UN starting to re-hat AMIS forces at the end of its mandate October 1 and the UN Secretariat's plan to deploy non-African forces into Darfur from January 2007. She urged Ismail to consider this timeline as a way forward based on his original proposal of a six-month assessment period and encouraged Sudan to become involved in the negotiations currently underway in New York to influence both the composition and the timing of the UN deployment.

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First Vice President Kiir  
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18. (C) First Vice President Salva Kiir and A/S Frazer discussed Darfur, CPA implementation, and the status of talks between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda. Kiir said that in Darfur, there were two separate issues: the question of UN-rehatting, and the problem of the

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non-signatories. Kiir said that he plans to go to Asmara on August 29 in an effort to urge the various players to cooperate. The Abdul Wahid and Ahmed Abdul Shafi factions are open to dialogue, can re-unite, and he is working to bring them to Southern Sudan for a meeting. President Bashir has blessed this course of action. Regarding Darfur, the SPLM favors transition from AU to UN command. He drew a parallel with the CPA process, noting that once the CPA was signed, the UN deployed. Now that the DPA has been signed, the UN should come in. Kiir said that opposition to the UN deployment comes from advisors surrounding President Bashir. Kiir feels the NCP has isolated itself, as all the opposition parties favor a UN transition. Bashir's position risks splitting the Government of National Unity. The official line claiming the unity of the government, espoused by Akol, Al-Khalifa, and Ismail was a "lie."

19. (C) On the LRA, Kiir was hopeful the recent cessation of hostilities between the LRA and Uganda would build momentum toward a long term solution. He claimed that Museveni agreed to the cessation after Kiir's visit and only on the condition the LRA agree to be encamped. Turning to the CPA implementation process, he noted that progress has been slow. Several commissions have yet to be properly established, including the Human Rights and the Land Commissions. The National Petroleum Commission and the Border Commission have

yet to become operational.

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Senior Assistant Minawi  
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¶10. (C) Minawi thanked A/S Frazer for her visit and U.S. support to the people of Darfur. Minawi outlined his two key issues: DPA implementation and improving security. He acknowledged that bringing in other SLM commanders was a top priority. He was actively engaging Darfur leaders, including Abdul Wahid and Ahmed Abdul Shafi, as well as reaching out to National Redemption Front (NRF) commanders. Minawi said his delegation in El Fasher was poised to meet senior NRF commanders soon. He noted there were still key differences between leaders and thought it better that Wahid and Shafi meet first to achieve a unified position prior to any larger conference. He was willing to play whatever part was required, finding positions within the DPA framework (within his capabilities), as well as working any political efforts outside the DPA. However, it was unlikely that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) would come to the table unless Chad first withdrew its soldiers and they were convinced that improved relations between Chad and Sudan would permanently weaken their position. In addition, the SPLM is making a good faith effort to assist, pursuing the possibility of a meeting of non-signatories in Yei, Southern Sudan. Septel will report in greater detail the status of efforts to convene a conference of non-signatories.

¶11. (C) Regarding security, Minawi said that AMIS capacity to address the needs of Darfur was nonexistent. Senior officials in the Ministries of Defense and Interior had convinced President Bashir that he could succeed in his efforts to thwart a UN transition and that a military solution could be successful. Minawi did not support the Government security plan. He had requested that any offensive be postponed during his efforts to reach out to the NRF, but admitted that if he did not succeed with the NRF, the SAF would most likely attack within the next few weeks, with dire consequences. Minawi fully supported a quick UN transition and had counseled President Bashir to cease his rhetoric and start negotiating. He said that Bashir did not have the support of the entire government on the issue nor had he built popular support for his position. Septel will report on the deteriorating security situation and the likely impact of renewed conflict on humanitarian access.

¶12. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this message.  
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